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1. Introduction 
 
Computer networks are complex interacting systems composed of individual entities such 
as various devices, workstations and servers. Nowadays, Internet Protocol (IP) is used as a 
dominant layer 3 protocol. The evolving nature of IP networks makes it difficult to fully 
understand the dynamics of the systems and networks. To obtain a basic understanding of 
the performance and behavior of these complex networks, large amount of information need 
to be collected and processed. Often, network performance information is not directly 
available, and the information obtained must be synthesized to obtain an understanding of 
the ensemble behavior.  
Traditional signature-based intrusion detection techniques use patterns of well-known 
attacks to match and identify known intrusions. The main drawback of theses techniques is 
inability to detect the newly invented attacks. To obtain sufficient information about 
complex network traffic and compensate for the weaknesses of traditional Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), Anomaly Detection Algorithms (ADA) are used [G.Maselli & L.Deri, 2003;  K. 
Hwang et al., 2004; A. Lazarevic et al., 2003]. Theses algorithms can be employed as a useful 
mechanism to analyze network anomalies and detect misbehaviors issued by users, or even 
unknown signature viruses and worms.  
There are two main approaches to study or characterize the ensemble behavior of the 
network [M. Thottan & C. Ji, 2003]: the first is inference of the overall network behavior and 
the second is to analyze behavior of the individual entities or nodes. The approaches used to 
address the anomaly detection problem depend on the nature of the data that is available for 
the analysis. Network data can be obtained at multiple levels of granularity such as 
network-level or end-user-level. The methods presented in this chpater are host-based 
ADA's and are categorized in the latter approach. 
In this chapter, we present some ADA's developed based on some classification methods. 
The goal of this chapter is to classify each user's behavior as anomalous or normal actions in 
an unsupervised fashion. Four different algorithms are disccusd and compared based on 
some defined measures.  
The experiments are performed on a real evaluation network test bed. Instances are 
captured in eight consecutive weeks, three weeks of training and five weeks of testing. Some 
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ARP anomaly criteria are defined. These criteria are applied to the three weeks training 
instances for generating normal ARP traffic. 
Performance evaluation of the approaches is conducted by five performance measures: 
Sensitivity, Specificity, Negative Likelihood Ratio, Positive Predictive Value, and Negative 
Predictive Value. Finally some comparisons are performed based on the defined measures.  
 
2. Background and Related Works  
 
Network anomaly detection is a vibrant research area. ARP anomaly detection in particular 
has been of great interest. Some methods for anomaly detection are based on switch 
characteristics, such as performance and backplane [D. Ármannsson et al., 2005]. In such 
methods switch characteristics must be known. Our knowledge is limited to theoretical 
backplane speed mentioned in datasheets. But, because switch processing power, especially 
when forwarding and flooding small packets, does not equal to that of theory and 
performance of switches in high load, small packet traffic degrade dramatically, so using 
such algorithm, encounters functional limitations.  
In other researches [D. Whyte et al., 2005], feature-based approaches for host-based analysis 
of ARP anomaly detection have been suggested. To achieve more accuracy on the results, 
more inputs factors to these algorithms are needed to be defined. Furthermore, the proposed 
factors have correlation with each other. None of these works include any suggestion about 
correlation between the factors, which affect on their precision. 
The proposed algorithm in [Shekhar R. Gaddam et al., 2007] is a supervised ADA. We are 
not provided with a set of anomalous and normal labeled training instances, mostly. So, 
supervised algorithms such as the one proposed in [Shekhar R. Gaddam et al., 2007] are 
confronted with limitations in practical applications. Furthermore, the majority of the works 
proposed in [N. Ye et al., 2004; D. Mutz et al., 2006; S. Kumar & E.H. Spafford, 1994; C. 
Kruegel & G. Vigna, 2003] evaluate the performance of anomaly detection methods on the 
measurements drawn from one application domain, thereby addressing the problem of 
anomaly detection on limited data instances collected from a single application domain. 
There are some other approaches that apply machine learning techniques like symbolic 
dynamics [A. Ray, 2004], multivariate analysis [N. Ye, et al., 2002], neural-networks [Z. 
Zhang et al., 2001], self-organizing maps [S.T. Sarasamma et al., 2005], fuzzy classifiers [J. 
Gomez & D.D. Gupta, 2001] and others [H.S. Javitz & A. Valdes, 1991; I. Levin, 2000; D.Y. 
Yeung & C. Chow, 2002; R. Agarwal & M.V. Joshi, 2000; G. Qu et al., 2005]. Almost all of 
these anomaly detection approaches apply single machine learning techniques while recent 
advances in machine learning show that selection, fusion and cascading [A. Verikas et al., 
1999; J. Kittler et al., 1998; L.I. Kuncheva, 2002] of multiple machine learning approaches 
have a better performance yield over individual approaches. 
 
3. Network Anomalies 
 
Network anomalies typically refer to circumstances when network operations deviate from 
normal network behavior. The anomalies can arise due to various causes such as 
malfunctioning network devices, bad configuration in network services and operating 
systems, network overload, malicious denial of service attacks, ill advised applications 
installed by users, high level users’ effort to discover network and gather information about 
 
it and its devices, and network intrusions that disrupt the normal delivery of network 
services. These anomalous events will disrupt the normal behavior of some measurable 
network data. The definition of normal network behavior for measured network data is 
dependent on several network specific factors such as dynamics of the network being 
studied in terms of traffic volume, the type of network data available, and types of 
applications running on the network. Accurate modeling of normal network behavior is still 
an active field of research, especially the online modeling of network traffic.  
Some of intrusions and malicious usages don’t have significant effects on network traffic 
(i.e. ARP Spoofing). So such misbehavior is not addressed in this chapter. Other types of 
attacks are based on broadcasting large number of packets with abnormal behavior, as in the 
case of DoS attacks. Abnormality is generally different from large number of packets, 
although large number of packets introduces abnormality to network traffic, too. High 
percentage of packets, degrade network performance. There are other types of attacks which 
apply broadcast traffic for detecting live hosts in network. Network anomalies can be caused 
by some unintentional and curious motivations, too. To detect these anomalies an algorithm 
is introduced in this chapter. The main objective of the ADA's is detection of zero-day 
worms and viruses broadcasting ARP requests to find vulnerable hosts. Besides, the 
approach will be very effective in preventing unwanted traffic, too. 
 
4. Anomaly Detection by Stochastic Learning Automata 
 
In this section the proposed method based on Stochastic Learning Automata (SLA) is 
described. A learning algorithm that constructs host-based learning models of normal ARP 
behavior from attack-free network ARP traffic is presented. Behavior that deviates from the 
learned normal model signals possible novel attacks.  
 
4.1 Formal Description of SLA  
An automaton is a machine or control mechanism designed to automatically follow a 
predetermined sequence of operations. The stochastic emphasizes the adaptive nature of the 
automaton. This adaptation is the result of learning process.  
Formally, the automaton can be represented by quintuple {,,,F(•,•), H(•,•)} [K. S. 
Narendra & M. A. L. Thathachar, 1989], where : 
 is a set of internal states. At any instant n, the state (n) is an element of the finite 
set which is as follow: 
 
= {i |i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s} (1) 
 
 is a set of actions (or outputs of the automaton). The output or action of an 
automaton at the instant n, denoted by (n), is an element of the finite set . 
Description of is as below:  
 
= {i |i, 1≤ i ≤ r} (2) 
 
 is a set of responses (or inputs from the environment). The input from the 
environment (n) is an element of the set which could be either a finite set or an 
infinite set, such as an interval on the real line: 
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ARP anomaly criteria are defined. These criteria are applied to the three weeks training 
instances for generating normal ARP traffic. 
Performance evaluation of the approaches is conducted by five performance measures: 
Sensitivity, Specificity, Negative Likelihood Ratio, Positive Predictive Value, and Negative 
Predictive Value. Finally some comparisons are performed based on the defined measures.  
 
2. Background and Related Works  
 
Network anomaly detection is a vibrant research area. ARP anomaly detection in particular 
has been of great interest. Some methods for anomaly detection are based on switch 
characteristics, such as performance and backplane [D. Ármannsson et al., 2005]. In such 
methods switch characteristics must be known. Our knowledge is limited to theoretical 
backplane speed mentioned in datasheets. But, because switch processing power, especially 
when forwarding and flooding small packets, does not equal to that of theory and 
performance of switches in high load, small packet traffic degrade dramatically, so using 
such algorithm, encounters functional limitations.  
In other researches [D. Whyte et al., 2005], feature-based approaches for host-based analysis 
of ARP anomaly detection have been suggested. To achieve more accuracy on the results, 
more inputs factors to these algorithms are needed to be defined. Furthermore, the proposed 
factors have correlation with each other. None of these works include any suggestion about 
correlation between the factors, which affect on their precision. 
The proposed algorithm in [Shekhar R. Gaddam et al., 2007] is a supervised ADA. We are 
not provided with a set of anomalous and normal labeled training instances, mostly. So, 
supervised algorithms such as the one proposed in [Shekhar R. Gaddam et al., 2007] are 
confronted with limitations in practical applications. Furthermore, the majority of the works 
proposed in [N. Ye et al., 2004; D. Mutz et al., 2006; S. Kumar & E.H. Spafford, 1994; C. 
Kruegel & G. Vigna, 2003] evaluate the performance of anomaly detection methods on the 
measurements drawn from one application domain, thereby addressing the problem of 
anomaly detection on limited data instances collected from a single application domain. 
There are some other approaches that apply machine learning techniques like symbolic 
dynamics [A. Ray, 2004], multivariate analysis [N. Ye, et al., 2002], neural-networks [Z. 
Zhang et al., 2001], self-organizing maps [S.T. Sarasamma et al., 2005], fuzzy classifiers [J. 
Gomez & D.D. Gupta, 2001] and others [H.S. Javitz & A. Valdes, 1991; I. Levin, 2000; D.Y. 
Yeung & C. Chow, 2002; R. Agarwal & M.V. Joshi, 2000; G. Qu et al., 2005]. Almost all of 
these anomaly detection approaches apply single machine learning techniques while recent 
advances in machine learning show that selection, fusion and cascading [A. Verikas et al., 
1999; J. Kittler et al., 1998; L.I. Kuncheva, 2002] of multiple machine learning approaches 
have a better performance yield over individual approaches. 
 
3. Network Anomalies 
 
Network anomalies typically refer to circumstances when network operations deviate from 
normal network behavior. The anomalies can arise due to various causes such as 
malfunctioning network devices, bad configuration in network services and operating 
systems, network overload, malicious denial of service attacks, ill advised applications 
installed by users, high level users’ effort to discover network and gather information about 
 
it and its devices, and network intrusions that disrupt the normal delivery of network 
services. These anomalous events will disrupt the normal behavior of some measurable 
network data. The definition of normal network behavior for measured network data is 
dependent on several network specific factors such as dynamics of the network being 
studied in terms of traffic volume, the type of network data available, and types of 
applications running on the network. Accurate modeling of normal network behavior is still 
an active field of research, especially the online modeling of network traffic.  
Some of intrusions and malicious usages don’t have significant effects on network traffic 
(i.e. ARP Spoofing). So such misbehavior is not addressed in this chapter. Other types of 
attacks are based on broadcasting large number of packets with abnormal behavior, as in the 
case of DoS attacks. Abnormality is generally different from large number of packets, 
although large number of packets introduces abnormality to network traffic, too. High 
percentage of packets, degrade network performance. There are other types of attacks which 
apply broadcast traffic for detecting live hosts in network. Network anomalies can be caused 
by some unintentional and curious motivations, too. To detect these anomalies an algorithm 
is introduced in this chapter. The main objective of the ADA's is detection of zero-day 
worms and viruses broadcasting ARP requests to find vulnerable hosts. Besides, the 
approach will be very effective in preventing unwanted traffic, too. 
 
4. Anomaly Detection by Stochastic Learning Automata 
 
In this section the proposed method based on Stochastic Learning Automata (SLA) is 
described. A learning algorithm that constructs host-based learning models of normal ARP 
behavior from attack-free network ARP traffic is presented. Behavior that deviates from the 
learned normal model signals possible novel attacks.  
 
4.1 Formal Description of SLA  
An automaton is a machine or control mechanism designed to automatically follow a 
predetermined sequence of operations. The stochastic emphasizes the adaptive nature of the 
automaton. This adaptation is the result of learning process.  
Formally, the automaton can be represented by quintuple {,,,F(•,•), H(•,•)} [K. S. 
Narendra & M. A. L. Thathachar, 1989], where : 
 is a set of internal states. At any instant n, the state (n) is an element of the finite 
set which is as follow: 
 
= {i |i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s} (1) 
 
 is a set of actions (or outputs of the automaton). The output or action of an 
automaton at the instant n, denoted by (n), is an element of the finite set . 
Description of is as below:  
 
= {i |i, 1≤ i ≤ r} (2) 
 
 is a set of responses (or inputs from the environment). The input from the 
environment (n) is an element of the set which could be either a finite set or an 
infinite set, such as an interval on the real line: 
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{i | i, 1≤ i ≤ m} or {(a,b)} (3) 
 
 F(•,•): is a function that maps the current state and input into the next 
state. F can be deterministic or stochastic: 
 
(n1) F[(n),(n)] (4) 
 
 H(•,•): is a function that maps the current state and input into the 
current output. If the current output depends on only the current state, the 
automaton is referred to as state-output automaton. In this case, the function 
H(•,•) is replaced by an output function G(•): , which can be either 
deterministic or stochastic: 
 
(n) G[(n)] (5) 
 
The automaton applied for our application is of type of the later case. 
 
4.2 General Reinforcement Scheme 
In order to describe the reinforcement scheme, p(n) is defined as a vector of action 
probabilities :  
 
Pi(n) = P( (n) =  i  ) , 1 < i < r (6) 
 
Updating action probabilities can be represented as follow: 
 
P(n+1) = T[p(n), (n), (n)] (7) 
 
where T is a mapping. This formula says the next action probability p(n+1) is updated based 
on the current probability p(n), the input from the environment and the resulting action. 
The general scheme for updating action probabilities for an r-action automaton in an 
environment with  is as follow:  
if (n) = i , when  = 0:  
 
pj(n+1) = pj(n) – gj(p(n)), j, j ≠ i (8.a.1) 
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and when  = 1 : 
 
Pj(n+1) = pj(n) + hj(p(n)), j , j ≠ i (8.b.1) 
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Where gk and hk, k = 1, 2, …, r are continuous, nonnegative functions with the following 
assumptions :  
 
 0 < gk(p(n)) < pk(n) (9.a) 
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4.3 Why Using SLA 
Nowadays in Intrusion Detection researches, efforts are mainly focused on misuse detection 
direction, since it is strait forward and easy to implement. But it has some inherent 
disadvantages. It is difficult to gather required information on known attack (content of TCP 
packets must be checked while maybe not enough). The most severe disadvantage is that it 
possibly can not detect attempts to new and unforeseen vulnerabilities. 
These disadvantages make Anomaly Detection approaches a vibrant research area. Here we 
will make some effort to do host-based anomaly detection.  
In order to model normal user’s behavior, we believe that a good model should be able to 
give a reasonable explanation of the real system. Here SLA is used to satisfy this condition. 
Our reasons are as follow: 
1. A computer user of a system should have some kind of routine behavior, especially 
for long-term computer users. This is what anomaly detection is based on. 
2. Each computer user should be in some kind of state, when using computer. This state 
corresponds to what he currently mainly wants to do. For example, at one time, the 
user wants to browse web sites for shopping, at another time, he wants to make 
programming, etc. In each state, the user will mainly do some correspondent actions 
which are different with other states. So from statistic aspect, the distribution of every 
kind of connections or commands in each state will be different from other states. 
3. Transition from one state to another can be treated roughly as state transition process 
of Finite State Machine. For the Steady State Duration time, we treat it as Gaussian 
(Normal) distribution, since human doing a task is not without remembering, so 
exponential distribution can not be used. On state transition decision, because human 
usually make decision on which task he will do next based on the previous several 
tasks he has done, so we treat the transition probability with conditional transition.  
So from above three aspects, we believe SLA can be used for modeling of computer user’s 
behavior in an understandable and accurate way. 
 
4.4 Modeling Normal Behavior of ARP Traffic with SLA 
For each node of network one automaton is learned from attack-free network ARP traffic.  
In this approach, there is one state corresponding to each node in the network. So that, the 
set of internal states for each node learning automaton is defined as follow:  
 
= {IPi | 0 ≤ i ≤ s} (10) 
 
Where IPi is the IP address of node i and s is the number of existing nodes in the network.  
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disadvantages. It is difficult to gather required information on known attack (content of TCP 
packets must be checked while maybe not enough). The most severe disadvantage is that it 
possibly can not detect attempts to new and unforeseen vulnerabilities. 
These disadvantages make Anomaly Detection approaches a vibrant research area. Here we 
will make some effort to do host-based anomaly detection.  
In order to model normal user’s behavior, we believe that a good model should be able to 
give a reasonable explanation of the real system. Here SLA is used to satisfy this condition. 
Our reasons are as follow: 
1. A computer user of a system should have some kind of routine behavior, especially 
for long-term computer users. This is what anomaly detection is based on. 
2. Each computer user should be in some kind of state, when using computer. This state 
corresponds to what he currently mainly wants to do. For example, at one time, the 
user wants to browse web sites for shopping, at another time, he wants to make 
programming, etc. In each state, the user will mainly do some correspondent actions 
which are different with other states. So from statistic aspect, the distribution of every 
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3. Transition from one state to another can be treated roughly as state transition process 
of Finite State Machine. For the Steady State Duration time, we treat it as Gaussian 
(Normal) distribution, since human doing a task is not without remembering, so 
exponential distribution can not be used. On state transition decision, because human 
usually make decision on which task he will do next based on the previous several 
tasks he has done, so we treat the transition probability with conditional transition.  
So from above three aspects, we believe SLA can be used for modeling of computer user’s 
behavior in an understandable and accurate way. 
 
4.4 Modeling Normal Behavior of ARP Traffic with SLA 
For each node of network one automaton is learned from attack-free network ARP traffic.  
In this approach, there is one state corresponding to each node in the network. So that, the 
set of internal states for each node learning automaton is defined as follow:  
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Where IPi is the IP address of node i and s is the number of existing nodes in the network.  
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The set of actions (or outputs of the automaton) is a set of triples as follow:  
 
= {(IPi, i, i2) | i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r} (11) 
 
Where IPi is the state identity and i and i2 are the Average and Variance of steady state 
duration, respectively which are defined as below:  
 
i
n
j
ij
i n
ti
 1  (12) 
 
222 ][][ iii tEtE   (13) 
 
Where tij is the elapsed time after jth ARP request with destination IP address corresponding 
to i until next ARP request with source IP address i issues. ni is the number of occurrence of 
the i (i.e., the number of ARP requests issued with destination IP address corresponding to 
state i).  
E[ti] and E[ti2] in the second expression are expected values (mean) of the random variables 
ti (steady state duration of state i) and ti2, respectively. 
There is one action (output) for each state of the automaton, so we have (r = s).  
The environment (network in our model) interacts with this automaton by introducing ARP 
requests to it. , the set of responses (or inputs from environment) is defined as follow:  
 
{reqi | 0 ≤ i ≤ m} (14) 
 
Where reqi is ARP request with destination IP address i. As stated earlier, the normal model 
is learned for each node x in the network. Therefore, the source IP address of all of the 
members of set  is same as the node whose normal model is under learning. It is obvious 
that m in this definition is equal to the number of nodes. We have (m = s).  
Each ARP request causes a transition from one state (the state corresponding to destination 
IP address of the previous ARP request) to another state (the state corresponding to the ARP 
request destination IP address). The formal description of transition function (F) is as stated 
below:  
 
IPn+1 = F (IPn, reqn+1) (15) 
 
The transition function F of the automaton is deterministic and the result of this function is 
uniquely specified for each state. For each special state X and reqY issued from the 
environment, the automaton changes its state from X to Y and this is deterministic. 
The current output of the model is dependant on only current state, so the automaton is 
state-output. The formal description of output function is as below: 
 
G(IPn) = (IPn, n, n2) (16) 
 
 
This function is stochastic and nondeterministic, because the output set  is updated 
whenever the environment interacts with the automaton (whenever an ARP request issues). 
The elements of the set G are denoted by gij. The value of this element represents the 
probability that the action performed by the automaton is (IPj, j, j2) given the automaton is 
in state IPi : 
 
Gij = P(n) = (IPj, j, j2) | (n) = IPi],   1 < i, j < s (17) 
 
In short the automaton takes an input from the environment and produces an action based 
on this.  
The automaton is a variable-structure one. Although, transition function F is deterministic 
and does not change over time, but the output function is stochastic and its value changes 
over time.  
 
4.5 The Reinforcement Scheme of the Proposed Model 
The reinforcement scheme is the basis of learning process for learning automata. The formal 
definition of reinforcement scheme can be obtained by substitution of functions in Equation 
(8) as follow: 
If (n) = IPn and the environment issues reqn then award function will be as: 
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The set of actions (or outputs of the automaton) is a set of triples as follow:  
 
= {(IPi, i, i2) | i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r} (11) 
 
Where IPi is the state identity and i and i2 are the Average and Variance of steady state 
duration, respectively which are defined as below:  
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Where tij is the elapsed time after jth ARP request with destination IP address corresponding 
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4.6 Anomaly Detection  
The purposed algorithm constructs a learning model of normal ARP traffic for each existing 
host in the network. The model resulted from this learning process is named as normal model. 
Discussion of producing normal ARP traffic will come, latter. Online network traffic is 
compared by the normal model in a process referred to as “matching process”. Any deviation 
from the normal model is an indication of anomaly which is quantified as Anomaly Score 
(AS) parameter. The algorithm makes decisions on normality or abnormality of each node 
by means of the calculated AS parameter in matching process.  
An important parameter in anomaly detection is an accurate threshold value. An indication 
of normality is used for this purpose, referred to as Normal Score (NS). This parameter is 
described latter. 
 
- Anomaly Score (AS) 
We apply AS as an anomaly indicator of a node ARP traffic and obtain it from weighted 
summation of Partial Anomaly Scores (PAS'es) as the following equation denotes:  
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Where N in the above equation is the number of previous environment responses (ARP 
requests issued in matching process) affecting on the AS value and decision making on 
normality or abnormality of the corresponding node, j is the state in the learning model 
which the node will be in after nth ARP request and njA  is the PAS, explained latter. 
AS is the PAS corresponding to the state which the node will be inside after the first ARP 
request ((N-1)th previous ARP request) and can be stated formally as follow: 
 
AS = Ai1,      1 ≤ i ≤ r (22) 
 
n
jK  is coefficient of the participating term in weighted summation of AS and is dependent 
on state j in learning model, such that occurrence of a state with low probability has more 
effect on AS than occurrence of a state with high probability. So the purposed value for this 
parameter is simply the inverted state probability: 
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This justification can be described for transition probability residing in denominator. Pij(n) is 
conditional probability of transition from state i to state j caused by nth ARP request 
(environment response njreq ), given the sequence of observed transitions in matching 
process. It can be formally described as follow: 
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Where, Tij is transition from state i to state j, 
123221 ...  nn IIIIII TTT is sequence of transitions in 
matching process, Ix indexes correspond to states where the node will be in after nth ARP 
 
request in matching process (after nInreq ), as I1 and In-1 indexes correspond to states S and i, 
respectively. This conditional probability is calculated in learning process as follow: 
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- Partial Anomaly Score (PAS) 
Defined as deviation from average steady state duration in a state: 
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Where njt  is the time interval between nth and (n+1)th ARP requests in matching process, 
such that the node will be in state j after nth ARP request.  
Steady state duration values, greater than average value (jn) for each state, indicate normal 
behaviors, so its effect does not participate in AS. 
There are some states in learning model which environment doesn't interact with them 
(there is not any reqi for such states labeled with i). For such states we have: 
 
i = (IPi, i, i2) = (IPi, 0, 0) (27.a) 
 
Pi(n) = 0 (27.b) 
 
A similar problem exists about sequences of transitions with these conditions. Minimum 
state probability among probabilities of all of the existent states is used for probability of 
such states and minimum probability among sequences of transitions corresponding to the 
node for the probability of such sequences of transitions, as formally stated below: 
 
Pi(n) = MIN {Pk(n) | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} (28.a) 
 
Pij(n) = MIN {Pik(n) | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} (28.b) 
 
Also, we considered statistical parameters of each state i satisfying conditions stated in 
equation (27) (parameters i, and i2), as follow: 
 
n
i  = MAX { nk  | 1 ≤ k ≤ r } (29.a) 
 
n
i  = MIN { nk  | 1 ≤ k ≤ r } (29.b) 
 
It means taking the worst case value for these parameters. 
 
- Normal Score (NS) 
NS, as hinted above, is an indicator of normality degree and is a function of partial NS'es 
(PNS). We define PNSi as normality score at ith time interval in learning process. NS is 
calculated as the following equation states:  
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Where njt  is the time interval between nth and (n+1)th ARP requests in matching process, 
such that the node will be in state j after nth ARP request.  
Steady state duration values, greater than average value (jn) for each state, indicate normal 
behaviors, so its effect does not participate in AS. 
There are some states in learning model which environment doesn't interact with them 
(there is not any reqi for such states labeled with i). For such states we have: 
 
i = (IPi, i, i2) = (IPi, 0, 0) (27.a) 
 
Pi(n) = 0 (27.b) 
 
A similar problem exists about sequences of transitions with these conditions. Minimum 
state probability among probabilities of all of the existent states is used for probability of 
such states and minimum probability among sequences of transitions corresponding to the 
node for the probability of such sequences of transitions, as formally stated below: 
 
Pi(n) = MIN {Pk(n) | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} (28.a) 
 
Pij(n) = MIN {Pik(n) | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} (28.b) 
 
Also, we considered statistical parameters of each state i satisfying conditions stated in 
equation (27) (parameters i, and i2), as follow: 
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n
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It means taking the worst case value for these parameters. 
 
- Normal Score (NS) 
NS, as hinted above, is an indicator of normality degree and is a function of partial NS'es 
(PNS). We define PNSi as normality score at ith time interval in learning process. NS is 
calculated as the following equation states:  
www.intechopen.com
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies724
 
NS = MAX {PNSi} (30) 
 
For calculating PNSi, we use the same method as used for calculation of AS, but in this case 
for normal ARP traffic. We get this normal traffic from purified traffic in different time 
intervals and calculate PNS for each interval. It is obvious that to obtain a right value for NS 
from PNS's, these time intervals should be of the same length. 
 
- Threshold calculations 
An estimation of ARP traffic normality is required for a right threshold values. The NS value 
gives this estimation to the hand. It is an indication of maximum value of AS without being 
detected as abnormal. ASi values calculated in matching process, satisfying the inequality 
NSi ≤ Thi < ASi for threshold value of Thi of node i, are detected as abnormal. Making 
decisions on Th values affect on False Negative and False Positive and accuracy of algorithm. 
There are various ways to this problem. One most simple and feasible way is to get 
threshold k times of NS. For example, the chosen value for k is 1.2 in [Kai Hwang, Hua Liu 
& Ying Chen, 2004]. 
 
5. Anomaly Detection by K-Means and ID3 Decision Trees 
 
5.1 Anomaly Detection by K-Means Algorithm 
The K-Means algorithm [R. Duda et al., 2000] groups N data points into k disjoint clusters, 
where k is a predefined parameter such that k < N. The steps in the K-Means clustering-
based anomaly detection method are as follows: 
1. Select k random instances from the training data subset as the centroids of the 
clusters C1, C2,…,Ck. 
2. For each training instance X: 
a. Compute the Euqlidean distance: 
 
D(Ci, X), i = 1...k. 
 
Find cluster Cq that is closest to X. 
b. Assign X to Cq. Update the centroid of Cq. (The centroid of a cluster is the 
arithmetic mean of the instances in the cluster.)  
3. Repeat Step 2 until the centroids of clusters C1, C2,…, Ck stabilize in terms of mean-
squared-error criterion. Finally, the algorithm aims at minimizing an objective 
function (here, squared error function). The objective function J: 
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where the term: 
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is a chosen distance measure between a data point ( )jiX  and the cluster centre cj, is 
an indicator of the distance of the N data points from their respective cluster 
centers. 
 
5.2 Anomaly Detection by ID3 Decision Trees 
The ID3 decision tree learning algorithm [T. Mitchell, 1997] computes the Information Gain G 
on each attribute A, as: 
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where S is the total input space and Sv is the subset of S for which attribute A has a value v. 
The Entropy(S) over c classes is given by: 
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where pi represents the probability of class “i”. The probability of class i is calculated as 
follow: 
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where, Nx is the number of training instances in class x. 
The attribute with the highest information gain, say B, is chosen as the root node of the tree. 
Next, a new decision tree is recursively constructed over each value of B using the training 
subspace S-{SB}. A leaf-node or a decision-node is formed when all the instances within the 
available training subspace are from the same class. The algorithm constructs the ID3 
decision tree with the normal purified traffic. Anomaly detection is performed using this 
tree by traversing the tree with features of test instance. If the traverse reaches a leaf node, 
the test instance will be detected as normal; else it will be detected as abnormal. 
 
5.3 Anomaly Detection by Combined K-Means Clustering & ID3 Decision Trees 
We are provided with a normal (purified) training data set Xi where each instance 
represents an n-dimensional vector. The approach has two phases: training and testing. 
During training phase, K-Means-based anomaly detection method is first applied to 
partition the training space into k disjoint clusters C1, C2,…, Ck. Then ID3 decision tree is 
trained with instances in each K-Means cluster. The K-Means clustering method ensures 
that each training instance is associated with only one cluster. However, if there are any 
subgroups or overlaps within a cluster, the ID3 decision tree trained on that cluster refines 
the decision boundaries by partitioning the instances with a set of if-then rules over the 
feature space.  
The combined application of the two algorithms overcomes some limitations of each 
algorithm when applied individually. For example, selection of a right value for parameter k 
in the K-Means clustering algorithm can affect on the overall accuracy of the algorithm. 
Considerably little values of k, compared to inherent number of natural subgroupings 
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where, Nx is the number of training instances in class x. 
The attribute with the highest information gain, say B, is chosen as the root node of the tree. 
Next, a new decision tree is recursively constructed over each value of B using the training 
subspace S-{SB}. A leaf-node or a decision-node is formed when all the instances within the 
available training subspace are from the same class. The algorithm constructs the ID3 
decision tree with the normal purified traffic. Anomaly detection is performed using this 
tree by traversing the tree with features of test instance. If the traverse reaches a leaf node, 
the test instance will be detected as normal; else it will be detected as abnormal. 
 
5.3 Anomaly Detection by Combined K-Means Clustering & ID3 Decision Trees 
We are provided with a normal (purified) training data set Xi where each instance 
represents an n-dimensional vector. The approach has two phases: training and testing. 
During training phase, K-Means-based anomaly detection method is first applied to 
partition the training space into k disjoint clusters C1, C2,…, Ck. Then ID3 decision tree is 
trained with instances in each K-Means cluster. The K-Means clustering method ensures 
that each training instance is associated with only one cluster. However, if there are any 
subgroups or overlaps within a cluster, the ID3 decision tree trained on that cluster refines 
the decision boundaries by partitioning the instances with a set of if-then rules over the 
feature space.  
The combined application of the two algorithms overcomes some limitations of each 
algorithm when applied individually. For example, selection of a right value for parameter k 
in the K-Means clustering algorithm can affect on the overall accuracy of the algorithm. 
Considerably little values of k, compared to inherent number of natural subgroupings 
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within the training data will lead to overlapping subgroups within clusters. This problem is 
compensated by ID3 decision tree constructed in each cluster.  
The testing phase of the algorithm includes two phases: the candidate selection phase and 
candidate combination phase. In the first phase, AS from K-Means clustering and decisions 
from ID3 decision tree are extracted. In the second phase, the final AS is gotten from 
combined results of K-Means clustering and ID3 decision tree. The algorithms applied for 
candidate selection and candidate combination is explained below. 
 
5.4 The Candidate Selection Phase 
Steps of the candidate selection algorithm are as follow: 
1. For each test instance Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n: 
a. Compute Euclidean distance: 
 
D(Zi, rj) , j = 1 < j < n, 
 
and find f clusters closest to Zi. 
b. Compute K-Means AS and extract decisions of ID3 decision trees for f 
nearest candidate clusters. 
2. Return Anomaly Score Matrix for Zi. 
The algorithm gets test instances Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the parameter f as inputs and gives matrix 
AS[f×2] for each test instance Zi. f is a user defined parameter. If DT1, DT2,…, DTk be the ID3 
decision tress on clusters C1, C2,…, Ck formed by applying the K-Means method on the 
training instances, and r1, r2,…, rk be the centroids of clusters C1, C2,…, Ck, respectively, then 
given a test instance Zi, the candidate selection procedure extracts AS'es from f candidate 
clusters G1, G2,…,Gk. The selected f candidate clusters are f clusters in C1,C2,…,Ck that are 
nearest to Zi in terms of Euclidean distance between Zi and the cluster centroids. 
Let l1, l2,…, lf  be the centroids of candidate clusters G1, G2,…, Gf  and the Euclidean distances 
between the test vector Zi and the f candidate clusters is as follow: 
 
D(Zi, lj) = dj,   1 ≤ j ≤ f (35) 
 
the AS for each of the f candidate clusters is calculated by K-Means clustering as follow: 
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(36) 
 
P(Cj) in the above equation is probability of cluster Cj and is calculated as the following 
equation indicates: 
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where the nominator in the above equation is the number of training instances of cluster Cj 
and the denominator is the total number of training instances.  
Term: 
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in equation (36) is referred to as Scaling Factor (SF). It scales P(Cj) by weighing it against the 
ratio of the Euclidean distance between the cluster j and Zi, and the sum of Euclidean 
distances between Zi and the clusters C1, C2,…, Ck. The SF penalizes the probability of cluster 
Cj with its distance from the test vector Zi, such that little distance Dj yields a high ASj and 
voice versa. The decision from the ID3 decision trees associated with the f candidate clusters 
are either "0" or "1" representing normal or abnormal test instances, respectively. This output 
is depended on that the decision trees can be traversed reaching to a leaf node.  
For each test instance Zi, the candidate selection phase outputs a matrix AS[f×2] with AS 
calculated by K-Means clustering algorithm and decision extracted from ID3 decision tree. 
The final AS resulted from combined application of the two algorithms is extracted by 
Candidate Combination. A detailed explanation of this algorithm follows. 
 
5.5 The Candidate Combination Algorithm 
Candidate Combination algorithm take as input the output of Candidate Selection 
algorithm, the AS matrix including the ASj, 1 < j < f, values of the K-means clustering 
algorithm and the decisions of ID3 decision trees over f candidate clusters. The algorithm 
then order the f candidate clusters G1, G2,…, Gk in AS matrix such that the distances 
d1,d2,…,df  between Z and the candidate clusters G1, G2,…, Gf , respectively, satisfy 
d1<d2<…<df . The first ASj value of the K-means clustering algorithm in the ordered AS 
matrix satisfying each of the below conditions, is selected as the final AS value of the 
combined K-Means clustering and ID3 decision tree algorithm. The conditions are: 
 
ASj ≤ 0.5 & DTj = 0 
ASj > 0.5 & DTj = 1 
 
Where DTj = "0" or DTj = "1", means ID3 decision tree of cluster j classifies the test instance 
as normal or abnormal, respectively. Finally, for each test instance Zi, an AS value in 
continuous closed interval [0,1] is yielded from the combined application of the two 
algorithms. The Threshold Rule is used for classification of the test instance Zi as an 
anomalous or normal instance. The threshold rule for classifying a test instance Zi that 
belongs to cluster Cr is as follow: 
 
Assign Z1 if AS >, 
Otherwise Z0. 
 
where   is a predefined threshold.  
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6. Evaluation Test Bed Network and Data Set 
 
Our test bed network in this research work was a typical network with about 900 active 
devices. With exception of a few servers, all of hosts run different Microsoft Windows 
platforms like windows 98, 2K, XP and 2003 Server. The network is connected to Internet via 
a 2Mbps link and about 200 stations and 5 servers are connected to internet concurrently. 
Internet access was enabled for majority of hosts. 
The captured data set contains approximately, eight weeks, three weeks of training and two 
weeks of test data. The main resources of abnormalities in our evaluation test bed network 
are malicious softwares, malfunctioning network devices, ill-advised applications, scanning 
tools and high level user’s efforts for network discovery. To capture network traffic we used 
a computer connected to the core switch of the network. Capturing traffic and some 
statistical parameters from it, is performed in real-time interaction with our prototype, by 
setting the sniffing machine's NIC in sniffing mode. A sniffing tool in VC++ powered by 
WinPcap application programming interface has been developed for traffic capturing. The 
implementations have been performed by Matlab V.7.5.0.342. 
Some anomaly criteria are defined and applied to the captured ARP traffic to generate 
normal training instances. These anomaly criteria are as follow:  
 ARP rate: this criterion is defined as the overall number of ARP requests divided by the 
length of time over which these were observed.  
 Burstiness: if we define the maximum instantaneous ARP request rate for a device to be 
the inverse of the shortest observed inter-request time between two consecutive 
requests from that devise, burstiness can be defined as the ratio of maximum request 
rate to the ARP rate. The burstiness characteristics of ARP traffic for our evaluation test 
bed network are illustrated in figure (1). This diagram shows that most devices in 
normal operation do not send ARP request broadcasts in bursts.  
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 Fig. 1. Burstiness characteristics of ARP traffic for our test network. 
 Sequential scans: sequential scan is defined as ARP requests with sequential destination 
IP addresses. ARP requests in normal conditions have not sequential destination IP 
addresses.  
 Dark space: is defined as ARP requests with destination IP addresses not included in 
address space of network.  
 
 Repetitive Requests: this criterion is defined as ARP Requests within time intervals 
smaller than expiration time of corresponding entries in ARP tables. ARP tables 
maintained by each host or network device are updated when an ARP request is issued. 
This caching mechanism prevents repetitive ARP requests. 
 
7. Evaluation & experimental results 
 
Our evaluation is based on the following criteria: 
 Sensitivity: probability that a test result will be positive when there is anomaly (True 
Positive or TP). 
 Specificity: probability that a test result will be negative when the there is not anomaly 
(True Negative or TN). 
 Negative likelihood ratio: ratio between the probability of a negative test result given the 
presence of the anomaly and the probability of a negative test result given the absence of 
the anomaly, i.e. Negative likelihood ratio = False negative rate / True negative rate = 
(1-Sensitivity) / Specificity. 
 Positive predictive value: probability that the anomaly is present when the test is positive. 
 Negative predictive value: probability that the anomaly is not present when the test is 
negative. 
ARP traffic has been applied to detect network abnormalities in the approach, as stated 
before. In K-Means clustering, ID3 Decision trees, and the combinatorial approach of 
these two algorithms we are provided with training and test data set Xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 
where Xi represents a 9-dimentional vector as follow: 
 
Xi=(Si1, Di1, Ti1,  Si2, Di2, Ti2, Si3, Di3, Ti3)  (38) 
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 Fig. 2. Iteration of sequences with different length. 
 
Six'es and Dix'es in the data instance Xi are source and destination IP addresses of ARP 
requests. We have used three successive ARP request characteristics in each data instance Xi. 
Tix is the discretely quantized time interval between two successive ARP requests. The 
main reason for using characteristics of multiple ARP requests in each data instance Xi, is 
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Six'es and Dix'es in the data instance Xi are source and destination IP addresses of ARP 
requests. We have used three successive ARP request characteristics in each data instance Xi. 
Tix is the discretely quantized time interval between two successive ARP requests. The 
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that user activities include some sequential activities which are depended on the state the 
user is in and what he mainly wants to do in that state. So, individual ARP requests can not 
be applied for detecting abnormalities. Figure (2) presents average iteration of ARP requests 
sequences with different length within four different days. As it is obvious from this figure, 
there is an egregious difference between iteration of sequences of length 3, 4 such that 
iteration of sequences of length 4 is as close to 1 as desired. So, we have used three 
successive ARP requests in each data instance Xi.  
The experimental results within five successive weeks are represented in table (1). The 
experiments are based on five evaluation measures, described above. The Sensitivity, 
Specificity, Negative Likelihood Ratio, Positive Predictive Value, and Negative Predictive 
Value characteristics of K-Means clustering, ID3 Decision tree, SLA-based and the 
combinatorial K-Means+ID3 is illustrated in figures (3) to (7). These figures show that: 
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Week 1 2 3 4 5 
Total Number of Test Instances 679100 856200 987000 598400 832700 
The Number of Abnormality Instances 4500 10900 3400 5900 4200 
Sensitivity 0.938326 0.958148 0.933155 0.961538 0.957303 
Specificity 0.999704 0.99942 0.999929 0.999747 0.999903 
Negative Likelihood Ratio 0.061692 0.041876 0.06685 0.038471 0.042701 
Positive Predictive Value 0.955157 0.956444 0.980337 0.976563 0.981567 
Negative Predictive Value 0.999585 0.999444 0.999746 0.999578 0.999771 
Table 1. Evaluation results of the K-means+ID3 in five weeks. 
 
1) K-Means+ID3 method has better performance than the other methods in terms of 
all defined measures.  
2) The performance of the SLA-based approach is in-between the combinatorial 
approach and each of individual K-Means and ID3. 
3) Individual K-Means has better performance than individual ID3. 
Malicious softwares by issuing a large number of ARP packets in little time intervals had 
large effects on traffic abnormalities. They assigned high percentage of triggered alarms to 
themselves. Bad-configured applications were the main origins of abnormality after 
malicious softwares. Curious users' activities, malfunctioning or bad configured network 
devices, and etc. affect on network traffic abnormalities but had a lower portion in it. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented some anomaly detection approaches for classification of anomalous 
and normal activities in computer network ARP traffic. The proposed approaches use some 
well-known machine learning methods: the SLA, K-Means clustering and the ID3 decision 
tree learning approaches. As described, in SLA-based approach a learning algorithm has 
been used for modeling of normal ARP traffic behavior. Making decisions on abnormal 
behavior of each device in the network is based on comparison of online behavior of each 
host by its normal model. In the combinatorial approach based on K-means and ID3 
decision trees, the K-Means method was first applied to partition the training instances into 
k disjoint clusters. The ID3 decision tree built on each cluster learns the subgroups within 
the cluster and partitions the decision space into finer classification regions; thereby 
improving the overall classification performance. This combinatorial method was compared 
with the individual K-Means and ID3 methods and the other proposed approaches based on 
SLA in terms of the overall classification performance defined over five different 
performance measures. Results on real evaluation test bed network data sets show that: the 
proposed method outperforms the individual K-Means and the ID3 compared to the other 
approaches. The performance of SLA is in-between the proposed combinatorial K-
Means+ID3 and individual K-Means and ID3, in terms of all the five performance measures 
over the real network ARP traffic data set.  
Further research should be carried out to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
approaches with other combinatorial approaches which can be developed by different 
clustering approaches.  
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approaches. The performance of SLA is in-between the proposed combinatorial K-
Means+ID3 and individual K-Means and ID3, in terms of all the five performance measures 
over the real network ARP traffic data set.  
Further research should be carried out to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
approaches with other combinatorial approaches which can be developed by different 
clustering approaches.  
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